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human life of this Christ is essentially inimitable. It is not like any other human life save in the *conditions* of temporal existence.

There are many earnest Christians today who would like to see some such Christology as that which is set forth in this book firmly established, but who insist that the critical questions of the historical value of the New Testament records must be squarely faced. It was one of the elements of strength in Dr. Denney's book that it made the attempt to deal fairly with critical questions. Professor Mackintosh's attitude here will be disappointing to many readers. Again there are Christians who agree with him that Christology must grow out of a vital religious valuation of Jesus, but who would like to have this valuation accurately analyzed, and its pronouncements justified by a psychological investigation of Christian experience. To assume, as Professor Mackintosh does, that the only valid Christian experience is a replica of that appearing in the Fourth Gospel is to beg the whole question. In short, while the book will doubtless furnish reassurance to those whose temperament and religious experience coincide with the author's, it will raise in the minds of others—as it has in the mind of the reviewer—the serious question whether a kenotic doctrine of the person of Christ does not necessitate such obscurantism in exposition as to repel those who care more for critical accuracy than for the retention of traditional formulae.

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CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY AND THE PROBLEM OF RELIGION

One of the ideas attracting most widespread attention today among serious students of the problem of religion is the "activism" offered by Professor Rudolf Eucken as a substitute for all forms of naturalism and for the current intellectualistic idealism as well. In the present article our task is to review five recently published books, two of which may be taken as representing naturalism in two of its most significant forms (positivism¹ and the new realism²); another two as representing the

¹ *The Positive Evolution of Religion: Its Moral and Social Reaction.* By Frederic Harrison. New York: Putnam, 1913. xx+267 pages. \$2.00.

² *The New Realism: Co-operative Studies in Philosophy.* By E. B. Holt, W. T. Marvin, W. P. Montague, R. B. Perry, W. B. Pitkin, and E. G. Spaulding. New York: Macmillan, 1912. xii+491 pages. \$2.50.

interpretation of religion offered by intellectualistic idealism (one in popular form,¹ and the other elaborated in more technical fashion by one who can speak for idealists with a good measure of authority²); while the fifth contains an estimate of the religious significance of the philosophy of Eucken himself.³

In Frederic Harrison's volume we have a collection of essays embodying the "final thoughts on the general problem of religion" of this last eminent surviving member of the Positivist church. What organized positivism stands for, according to this authority is, the guidance of human conduct by a religion founded upon science, and by a science inspired by religion. He begins in an eirenic manner, maintaining that the spiritual motive which inspires positivism and Christianity is essentially the same. "We mean the same thing," he insists, "as the churches mean." The claim is soon made, however, that while the religion of humanity includes all that is essential in the religion of Christ, it includes much more besides. For the positivist "every dedication of one's life to good is a Sacrament; every great life is an Incarnation; every great thought is a Revelation; every saint is a Son of Man; every hero is our Lord; every perfect woman is our Lady and our Holy Mother." But, on the other hand, all that has been most characteristic of historic religion, as expressed in the ideas of an almighty God, revelation from this God to man, and man's personal salvation through union with God, is wholly eliminated. As substitutes positivism offers the ideal of human providence, the practical religion of social duty, and a rational philosophy founded upon scientific demonstration.

Now it is true enough, as Harrison says, that there is a large measure of overlapping between what the Positivist church and the Christian churches propose to accomplish. But it is not positivism that is the more inclusive. All of positive value in what Positivism stands for is already included in the practical idealism and social ethics of modern Christianity, while Christianity has, besides, all the inspirational advantages accruing from religion proper in its most ethical form. It simply

¹ *The Problem of Religion*. By Emil Carl Wilm. Boston: The Pilgrim Press, 1912. xii+240 pages. \$1.25.

² *The Interpretation of Religious Experience*. The Gifford Lectures, 1910-12. By John Watson. Vol. I. Historical. xiv+375 pages. Vol. II. Constructive. Glasgow: MacLehose, 1912. x+342 pages. \$6.00.

³ *An Interpretation of Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy*. By W. Tudor Jones. New York: Putnam, 1912. 250 pages.

remains to complete the work of making rational and scientific the theological thought of this religion of individual and social redemption.

The volume entitled *The New Realism* undertakes no discussion of the religious problem, but it may very well be included here on the ground that, being of very definite importance for philosophy in general, it can scarcely be without significance, ultimately, for the philosophy of religion. A philosopher whose opinion is entitled to considerable weight has ventured the prediction that this volume will be to much of the philosophy of the immediate future what Locke's *Essay* was to the older empiricism.

After a very important introductory essay, voicing the common views of the six authors, there are the following individual contributions: "The Emancipation of Metaphysics from Epistemology," by W. T. Marvin; "A Realistic Theory of Independence," by R. B. Perry; "A Defense of Analysis," by E. G. Spaulding; "A Realistic Theory of Truth and Error," by W. P. Montague; "The Place of Illusory Experience in a Realistic World," by E. B. Holt; and "Some Realistic Implications of Biology," by W. B. Pitkin. In an appendix we find reprinted the much-discussed article entitled "The Program and First Platform of Six Realists," which appeared some two or three years ago.

This American brand of the new realism, like the new realism of certain contemporary English philosophers, differs from the older critical realism chiefly in holding that in perception there is an immediate awareness of independent objects, no new quality being added to the object as the immediate result of its coming to be known, except this quality itself of being known. The chief difference between the English and American schools lies in the interpretation of consciousness. The English philosophers view consciousness as the activity of a non-physical subject, directed toward the physical object. The American realists, speaking generally, seem determined to reduce consciousness either to a mere relation—however unique—between one physical object (the body of the knower) and another (the object known), or else to a peculiar sort of behavior on the part of the human or other animal organism. Thus, while the English school retains some measure of affiliation with spiritualistic philosophy, the American movement is strongly naturalistic and materialistic in its tendency. Both, however, lie open to the charge of setting up a new dogmatism in opposition to the dogmatism of idealism. What necessary reason, theoretical or practical, can be found for affirming the continued existence of the colors and other sense-

qualities of physical objects when no one is sensing them? The dogma, moreover, is beset with theoretical difficulties and is the chief source of the neo-realists' inability to say just what it is that consciousness is or does.

Still, the movement as a whole is not without promise for the philosophy of religion. Corresponding to this new realism we have the new mysticism—the new realism in religion it might be called. Both are ultra-dogmatic; but, with further criticism the dogmatism may possibly be eliminated, leaving defensible in the one case the theory that in normal sense-experience we have genuine experience of an independently existing physical object, and in the other case the view that in normal religious experience there is real knowledge of an independently existing religious object.

Professor Wilm's Bowdoin prize essay on *The Problem of Religion* begins with a characterization of the present as a time of religious unrest, due to a variety of causes, the most important of which are held to be the excessive specialization of modern science, the mechanistic philosophy, the change of attitude toward biblical tradition, and the waning influence of church and home in modern society. In view of this situation the author undertakes to justify religion theoretically and practically in the eyes of modern scientific and philosophical thinkers.

Religion is defined as "an emotion based upon a conviction that events are being overruled in view of a supreme and lasting good, and an attitude of co-operation with the Power in the universe making for this good"; or, more briefly, as theistic optimism. For the philosopher the problem of religion resolves itself into the following questions: Is reality matter or spirit? Is the course of the universe mechanical or telic? Is the world on the whole good or bad? and, What is the moral value of religion?

The answer offered to the first question is idealism in its simple, popular form. Sense-qualities depend upon consciousness; "primary qualities" are relations unifying sense-qualities and hence also dependent upon consciousness; physical objects, therefore, are mere ideas, depending upon consciousness for their existence. But common-sense and science compel us to believe in the existence of physical objects before we, or any human being, existed. They must have existed, then, as ideas in the mind of God.

But this idealistic argument for the existence of God is by no means so conclusive as is commonly supposed. In the first place, subjective idealism is not the necessary outcome of the analysis of sense-perception.

It may be maintained that the power of clothing physical objects with sense-qualities on certain conditions is an ability achieved long since by the race in the course of a "creative evolution" and inherited by the normal individual. On this view sensing is a psychical activity in and through which a previously existing part of the physical environment is directly presented—or at least qualified for direct presentation—to the perceiving subject. Apperceptive activity—originally the representing of aspects formerly presented—may come to be so ready as to give practically immediate presentation of further qualities of the independent object. Thus perceptual activity may be regarded as a process of exploration, and certain of its results as giving valid information about the supposedly unknowable *Ding-an-sich*. In the second place, subjective idealism may be shown to be the outcome of a suggestion which, when explicitly stated, is seen to be utterly fallacious. All perceived objects are, of course, related to the perceiving subject during perception, whether that relation chances to be thought of or not. Illusory objects and erroneous predications cannot usually be successfully treated as objectively real. But they have some sort of reality, and so are referred to the self, as dependent upon it for their reality. Thus the illusory and erroneous are the first elements of experience to be thought of as being related to the conscious subject. But soon or late it dawns upon one that all perceived objects are related to the conscious self. Then, through a confusion of the idea "related to self (as object for subject)" with the idea formerly *associated* with it, viz., "dependent (as object) for its existence upon its relation to the conscious subject," it is concluded that all perceived objects are "merely subjective." So stated, the fallacy is readily apparent; but it is this subjective idealism which is necessary as a premise in Professor Wilm's theistic argument. It is essentially the argument of Berkeley, but as a basis for theism and religion it is a foundation of sand.

The second question—the problem of mechanism or teleology—is answered by pointing out that since in the experience of man a volitional element is always associated with cognition, it is a natural hypothesis that the world is not merely dependent upon God's thought, but expressive of God's will. The obvious criticism here is that, whatever value this interpretation of cause in the world after the analogy of human volition may have in itself or on other grounds, as here presented, it presupposes the validity of idealism, and must share in the insecurity of its foundation.

The unsatisfactory character of the answer to the third question—

the problem of evil—is foreshadowed by the initial assertion that it is futile to begin with the goodness of God, for the reason that our knowledge of God is to be derived from our knowledge of the world, and if the world were bad there would be no ground for asserting the goodness of God. In spite of the ever-present fact of death and other evils, idealism, it is maintained, enables us to regard the world as essentially good and to hope for immortality. But in opposition to this way of approaching the problem it may be urged that in the history of ethical religion those who have been surest of the goodness of God and of the instrumental goodness of the world have been those who have been most keenly aware of the evils that are in the world, and who have been made conscious of a divine power lifting them above those evils. The old theological concept of revelation needs to be revised, no doubt, but it is a fatal mistake for the philosophy of religion to discard it entirely.

In the answer to the fourth question—that of the moral values of religion—much is rightly made of the energies released by religion. The author apparently fails, however, to note the value of religious experience at its best as affording a basis for an empirical knowledge of the religious object; hence he closes his discussion at the very point where at last he stood upon the only solid foundation for the philosophy of religion.

The recent Gifford Lectures by John Watson on *The Interpretation of Religious Experience* make good reading for one who is pleased with a consistent exposition and defense of a definite philosophical standpoint, whether that be his own or not. As an orthodox Hegelian, Professor Watson approaches his subject from the historical, idealistic-evolutionary point of view. Maintaining that “if we have faith in the essential rationality of man, we must conclude that neither in his ordinary religious consciousness, nor in his reflective formulation of its contents can he have fallen into absolute error,” he aims to have his constructive work grow out of a critical examination of the development of religious and philosophical thought from antiquity down to the present day. In the first volume, accordingly, the lectures deal with the following topics: “The Development of Greek Religion and Theology,” “Primitive Christianity and Its Exponents,” “From Origen to Thomas Aquinas,” “Dante’s Theology and Politics,” “Eckhart, Descartes, and Spinoza,” “Leibnitz, Locke, and the English Deists,” “Berkeley and Hume,” “The Critical Philosophy,” “Hegel’s Relation to Kant,” and “Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion.”

There are some valuable discussions in the historical volume, but it

is in the second volume that interest centers from the point of view of this review. And yet here, too, a large part of the discussion is critical, rather than constructive. As in the case of his old master, Edward Caird, the essentials of Watson's own philosophy can be stated in small compass, and are most readily unfolded in connection with the criticism of other more or less antagonistic views. For an authoritative and consistent exposition of the orthodox British Hegelianism one cannot do better than have recourse to the works of the author under review, but for an understanding of the most recent philosophical developments one should seek other sources of information than the volume before us. It is hard for the Hegelian to realize that in the history of recent thought the dialectic of criticism and reconstruction has been at work upon Hegelianism itself, so that it may be fairly contended that, even in the well-guarded form in which we find it in the works of Caird and Watson, it is already an "overcome standpoint." Hence the new antitheses to Hegelianism are interpreted either as already included in the Hegelian system rightly understood, or else as a reversion to some earlier point of view which has already been taken into account in the Hegelian synthesis. Thus for Watson "radical empiricism" is still infected with the vice of the older empiricism; he is unable to see that the "new realism" has added anything essential to the principles of Locke, or "personal idealism" to those of Berkeley and Leibnitz; and even the "absolutism of Dr. Bradley," in so far as it is not assimilable by the older absolute idealism, is regarded as infected with "the vice of Spinozism." To acknowledge as really valid a new antithesis would require the dialectic of thought to progress beyond Hegelianism itself. Radical empiricism, the new realism, personal idealism, and the Bradleian absolutism may themselves be inadequate on many counts, and nevertheless it may still be true that they have made such inroads upon the structures of the older idealism that, as a system, it is already disintegrated beyond repair. The "reconstruction" must not be a mere repetition of the old, but, in considerable measure, a new production.

But are we justified in assuming that Hegelianism, as Watson interprets it, was, even in its own day, the truth, and nothing but the truth, however far short it may have fallen of compassing the whole truth? Even this seems too much to maintain. It has always been claimed for speculative idealism that it rests upon rational necessity. It has appealed unto logic; to logic, then, let it go. Its fundamental argument, as Watson himself states it, may be summarized as follows: The real is intelligible (the contrary proposition being self-refuting);

the intelligible is rational; the rational is spiritual; therefore the real is spiritual. Moreover, the intelligible is a unity; hence the real is a spiritual unity, or in other words, one all-inclusive, rationally ordered experience. Now, apart from the difficulties urged by Bradley and others, as making against the tenability of this conclusion on any grounds, the reasoning involved in the above thought-transitions is easily shown to be hopelessly fallacious. In the first place, from the self-refuting character of a dogmatic, total agnosticism, with its assertion, No reality is intelligible, what one is entitled to conclude is not, All reality is intelligible, but simply, Some reality is intelligible. If it be maintained that it is not simply the contrary of the proposition in question that is self-refuting, but its contradictory, viz., Some reality is not intelligible, the answer is that this latter proposition, even if not demonstrable, is not refutable, save from the point of view of the absolute rationalism founded upon it; and this, of course, would be a begging of the question. But even apart from the dogmatism of the first major premise, there is in the further argument an easily detected *non-sequitur*. A moment's reflection will show that the meaning of "rational" according to which it is synonymous with "intelligible" is very different from the sense in which it implies spirituality of constitution. The one is a quality of the object; the other, a quality belonging exclusively to the conscious subject. Hence either the term "rational" is used in different senses in the two propositions, in which we have the fallacy of "four terms"; or, if used in the same sense in both cases, one or other of the two propositions is a pure dogma. All that we can logically conclude from the revised premises, therefore, is that *some* reality is *perhaps* spiritual—which is less than that of which we were sufficiently convinced without any argument.

But apart from all questions of demonstration, there is the further question of the religious value of the content of the philosophy in question. On this point it may be sufficient to say we have here once more the attempt to state the essential content of Christian doctrine in harmony with the quasi-pantheistic implications of absolute idealism, with the result in some instances at least that what is retained of the Christian doctrine is little more than the language in which it is expressed. It is in keeping with this that the "religious experience," of which the lectures before us are presented as the "interpretation," is simply man's "experience of the spirituality (rationality) of the universe." To be sure, it must be conceded that the emphasis upon the *concreteness* of the Absolute, by virtue of which it includes all differences, gives at least

an *appearance* of validity to the claim that, when all forms of being are viewed as manifestations of a single absolute principle, this is not really prejudicial to the moral interests of man. And yet, on the other hand, even this course has its dangers. The more Reality is identified with the concrete in the form of the merely phenomenal and further content of the same sort, the more that transcendent, but accessible, creative, spiritual Reality which is the proper object of religious faith, suffers reduction, until a point is reached where the characteristically religious attitude has at length become a logical impossibility.

The final volume to be reviewed here is Dr. Tudor Jones's book on the philosophy of Rudolf Eucken, the preparation of which was a labor of love on the part of a grateful and devoted disciple. The author may be said to have succeeded, not only in setting forth the most central ideas of Eucken's philosophy, but in giving an insight into the spirit of the man and his purpose as a philosopher—an aid to interpretation which is of peculiar importance in the present instance.

In opposition to the varied forms of naturalism on the one hand, and intellectualistic idealism on the other, Eucken sets up his *activism*, or philosophy of the Spiritual Life. His English disciples commonly speak of this philosophy as "the new idealism," or "religious idealism"; but Eucken simply consents to use this "worn-out expression," as he calls it, "for the sake of brevity." Neither in method nor in doctrine is he to be regarded as a typical idealist. In truth, as making fundamental the idea of an independent Spiritual Life, of which man becomes cognizant as his own life becomes more spiritual, Eucken is to be regarded as a spiritual realist. Still, inasmuch as he retains the impression that, to maintain the independent reality of the spiritual, we must deny the independent reality of the physical, he is able to think of his philosophy as still in some sense idealistic.

But to understand Eucken's doctrine we must approach it from the side of his method. He himself calls this method *noölogical*. It is contrasted with the merely empirical, psychological method, which does not take account of the whole active, spiritual nature; and also with the intellectualistic, speculative method, which does not make use of the whole spiritual life as a means of arriving at the truth. In contrast with the Hegelian method of reconciliation of opposites, by means of the dialectic of critical and constructive thought, Eucken's method is to transcend the various inadequate and opposing views, by penetrating more deeply into the life of the spirit—by experiencing, indeed, a profound and constantly renewed spiritual conversion. The fundamentals

even of philosophical truth itself are regarded as being revealed, not necessarily to the most logical thinkers, but to those who are most appreciative of spiritual values. Instead, then, of a synthesis of opposing world-views, which to Eucken seems mere compromise, there is set up a new antithesis. Instead of "immanent idealism" as a compromise between the older religious view on the one hand, and naturalism on the other, he would set up a philosophy of freedom and spiritual depth; instead of viewing ultimate Reality as a world-including Absolute Reason, he affirms another "world" of reality, the inwardly manifested world of the "Independent Spiritual Life."

There is undoubtedly much that is still vague and incompletely thought out in Eucken's philosophy. Apart from minor defects there are perhaps three main criticisms to be made against his system of thought. First, the reduction of other philosophical movements to their "inwardness," whereby they are viewed as the expression, in each case, of a life-attitude, is not enough. These philosophies must be met on their own ground, and their supposed logical necessity shown to be unreal. In the second place, there must be faced the question as to what the result upon the rest of the system would be if the idealistic interpretation of the physical object were eliminated, as due to erroneous analysis. And finally, the metaphysics of the "Independent Spiritual Life" is left in a very incomplete condition. One is inclined to raise the question whether this may not be due to the fact that Eucken, in identifying "universal religion" too closely with the mere recognition of the "Spiritual Life," and attaching no special cognitive value to "characteristic religion," leaves no room for a constructive theology. In the reviewer's judgment, there can be no adequate metaphysics without theology, nor any valid theology which does not rest upon definite religious experience, such as requires an active adjustment to the religious Object, rather than a mere recognition of the existence, on grounds more or less philosophical, of an independent Spiritual Life. Still, with all these criticisms, it may be maintained that there are in the philosophy of Eucken suggestions for religion and theology, and ultimately for metaphysics, more valuable than are to be found in any of the systems of thought which it seeks to displace. Dr. Jones and others are to be thanked for what they are doing to make these views accessible to the English-reading public.

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